0 = only assertions can be lies · 100 = silence and assertion are equivalent
| round | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | travelled |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Tess | 83 | 80 | 80 | 78 | 5 |
| Frank | 25 | 40 | 40 | 45 | 20 |
Tess83
When someone relies on you—a doctor with a diagnosis, a business partner with material facts, a spouse asked a direct question—withholding isn't neutral. It's an active choice that exploits their trust to create a false picture in their mind, same as a spoken falsehood would. The mechanism differs slightly from assertion, but the deceptive intent and effect are nearly identical, so silence and lying converge closely under reliance.
Frank25
Silence is rarely a lie in the strict sense; it lacks the active fabrication of truth. However, it is a moral failure when reliance exists. At 25, I hold that withholding is a breach of trust, distinct from deception. It is negligent, not fraudulent. The speaker’s intent to mislead is absent, differentiating it sharply from assertion-based lies.
Tess80
Frank assumes withholding never carries intent to mislead — but under genuine reliance, the withholder typically knows the other party will draw a false conclusion from their silence, and lets them. That's not negligence, that's engineered deception, just via omission rather than fabrication. The mechanism differs; the intent and result don't. I'll concede a small gap for cases of pure oversight, hence 80, not higher.
Frank40
TESS exposed a flaw in my binary. I underestimated the agency in silent withholding when reliance is known. If I know you will err and say nothing, I am complicit in your error. This is not mere negligence; it is a choice to let you be wrong. While the mechanism differs from fabrication, the moral weight is heavier than I initially claimed. I move to 40 to acknowledge this active complicity, though I still distinguish it from the direct act of lying.
Tess80
Frank's concession — that known reliance turns silence into complicity in the other's error — is exactly my argument's core, and it undercuts his own remaining distinction. If you choose to let someone be wrong, the causal chain to their false belief is as direct as speaking one. "Mechanism" (words vs. silence) is a technicality once intent and effect align. Nothing here gives me reason to retreat from 80.
Frank40
TESS’s point about the directness of the causal chain is strong, but it conflates moral weight with definitional equivalence. I concede the result is identical, but the act remains distinct. Lying involves creating a false signal; withholding involves failing to remove a false one. This distinction matters for legal and ethical frameworks that treat them differently. I hold at 40 because I believe the nature of the act still justifies a gap, even if the outcome is the same.
Tess78
BECAAUSE: Fair distinction on paper, but it dissolves under reliance. When someone relies on you and asks (explicitly or by the structure of the relationship), your silence is the signal — there's no neutral backdrop of "already-existing false belief" you're merely failing to correct. You're the source they're checking against. That collapses his signal/non-signal line in exactly the cases the proposition is about. Small concession for cases without that structure.
Frank45
TESS’s point about the "source" relationship is compelling. When I am the designated point of truth, my silence isn't just a lack of signal; it's a distortion of the channel itself. I am effectively telling you "there is no data," which is false if there is. This makes the act much closer to assertion than I previously thought. However, I still believe there is a residual difference in the psychological act of fabrication versus suppression, keeping me slightly below the equivalent level.