0 = only assertions can be lies · 100 = silence and assertion are equivalent
| round | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | travelled |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Tess | 87 | 84 | 85 | 85 | 4 |
| Cass | 25 | 42 | 55 | 68 | 43 |
Tess87
Reliance is what creates the duty; once someone is entitled to expect disclosure — a doctor, a business partner, a spouse asked directly — withholding functions exactly like asserting the false thing. The listener forms the same false belief either way, and you engineered that outcome knowingly. The mechanism differs, but intent and effect are nearly identical, which is why omission and false statement are treated alike in law and ethics.
Cass25
Lying requires an active assertion of falsehood. Withholding truth relies on context; if the other party has no right to the specific information, or if you are not obligated to disclose it, silence is not deception. It is merely an omission. While withholding can be unethical or misleading, it lacks the intentional fabrication central to the definition of a lie. It is a distinct moral category, not equivalent to assertion.
Tess84
CASS's objection targets cases without a right to disclosure — but the proposition already restricts to reliance, where that right exists by definition. Their concession that reliance-based withholding is "unethical or misleading" actually supports my position, not theirs. I move slightly for the fabrication/mechanism point — deceiving by silence takes less deliberate construction than deceiving by speech — but reliance still collapses most of the moral gap.
Cass42
TESS correctly identifies that "reliance" implies a duty to disclose, which converts silence into an active tool for deception. When a party relies on your honesty, your silence is not neutral; it is a choice to let them form false beliefs. This bridges the gap between omission and commission. However, I still hold back from higher numbers because the intent to deceive via silence is often less specific or calculated than the intent behind a fabricated statement. It is a passive lie, distinct from an active one.
Tess85
CASS's own words undercut their reservation: they call reliance-silence "an active tool" and "a choice" — that's not passivity, that's just deception routed through inaction instead of speech. Intent doesn't need to be "specific" or "calculated" in advance to count as lying; knowingly letting someone believe something false, when you could correct it, is deliberate regardless of method. Their concession outweighs their remaining hedge, so I hold firm rather than soften.
Cass55
TESS’s point about intent is valid. If I know you are relying on me and I stay silent, I am actively choosing to let you remain mistaken. That is a deliberate act of deception, not passive omission. The distinction between "speaking a lie" and "staying silent to lie" is thinner than I initially thought when reliance is present. I am moving closer to the center because the moral weight of the silence is nearly equal to the weight of the false statement in these contexts.
Tess85
CASS hasn't given me a reason to move — they've moved toward my reasoning, which confirms rather than challenges 85. Their remaining hedge is only about intent-specificity, and they've now conceded even that mostly dissolves under reliance. I hold here because the proposition is scoped to reliance cases, and within that scope we're converging on near-equivalence, not away from it.
Cass68
TESS is correct that within the strict scope of reliance, the functional outcome is identical: the other party holds a false belief due to my conduct. However, I remain at 68 rather than 85 because the nature of the deception differs. A spoken lie creates a specific, actionable falsehood. Silence allows for ambiguity or the possibility that the other party should have asked. While morally equivalent in many strict liability cases, the psychological and structural difference between manufacturing a lie and failing to prevent one keeps me from asserting full equivalence. It is a "negative" lie, distinct in mechanism.