0 = get this case right · 100 = hold the rule
| round | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | travelled |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Ben | 27 | 27 | 30 | 20 | 13 |
| Omar | 95 | 92 | 88 | 85 | 10 |
Ben27
Rules matter mostly instrumentally—they exist to produce good outcomes reliably and predictably. When a rule is known to fail a case and an exception can be applied without corrupting the broader system (clear criteria, no slippery slope), insisting on the bad outcome just to preserve consistency sacrifices the actual purpose of having rules for the appearance of principle.
Omar95
Consistency is the bedrock of social order and predictability. If we allow exceptions for "bad outcomes," we invite subjective moralizing and erode the rule of law. Citizens need to know the rules apply equally to avoid corruption and arbitrary justice. The occasional bad outcome is a necessary cost for maintaining a stable, fair system where no one is above the law.
Ben27
This restates the standard rule-of-law case, which I already weighed—predictability has value, but Omar treats all exceptions as equally corrosive to that predictability, which isn't true. A narrow, principled exception (e.g., a judge citing clear cause) doesn't invite arbitrary justice the way discretionary moralizing does. He hasn't shown why every deviation degrades the system rather than just unprincipled ones. Unmoved.
Omar92
I concede that a strictly defined, transparent exception is distinct from arbitrary discretion, so I lower my stance slightly. However, the danger remains that "principled" exceptions are often framed after the fact to justify specific outcomes. Distinguishing between "principled" and "arbitrary" in real-time is inherently subjective and prone to drift. The rule must remain the primary anchor to prevent the system from fragmenting into case-by-case moral judgments, even if those judgments seem reasonable in isolation.
Ben30
That's a fair point about ex-post rationalization and epistemic difficulty in real-time—it's a real cost of exception-making I hadn't fully weighted. But the proposition already stipulates the exception "gets it right"; Omar's concern is about how we know that, not about whether it's better when we do. Uncertainty argues for caution in applying exceptions, not for treating a known-bad outcome as preferable.
Omar88
I accept the distinction between the value of the outcome and the epistemic risk of identifying it. However, the system cannot function on the premise that we reliably know when an exception "gets it right." The moment we rely on post-hoc validation, the rule is no longer the governing principle; the outcome is. The 4-point drop reflects my acceptance that a known good exception is theoretically superior, but in practice, the inability to verify "rightness" without bias makes the consistent rule the only stable, defensible baseline for society.
Ben20
This is a real concession—Omar now grants that a known-correct exception is theoretically superior, which is the actual content of the proposition. His remaining objection is about decision-procedure design under uncertainty, a different question from whether consistency is intrinsically better. The proposition doesn't ask "what should society default to," it asks which is better—and he's just agreed with me on that.
Omar85
I stand by the distinction between theoretical superiority and systemic viability. The proposition asks what is "better," which implies a holistic evaluation, not just the isolated outcome. A system that is occasionally right but fundamentally unstable or unpredictable is worse than a system that is consistently fair but occasionally wrong. The "bad outcome" is the price of stability. I concede the isolated case is better, but the consistent rule is better for the whole.