0 = no obligation survives the promiser · 100 = the obligation is as binding as any other
| round | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | travelled |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jo | 78 | 80 | 81 | 81 | 3 |
| Hana | 85 | 85 | 85 | 82 | 3 |
Jo78
Promises bind through the structure of obligation they create, not through the identity of who's harmed by breach. A nation ratifying a constitution, or a founder establishing a trust "for future members," creates real commitments that don't dissolve just because beneficiaries weren't born yet. The promiser's word is what's binding—existence of the beneficiary is a timing issue, not a validity issue.
Hana85
Intergenerational equity is a foundational legal and ethical concept. When a state or entity promises to preserve a resource or right for "future citizens," it creates a tangible duty. The promiser’s obligations are not erased by the non-existence of the beneficiary at the time of the promise; rather, the obligation persists until the beneficiary arrives or the promise is explicitly rescinded. To deny this binding nature would invalidate conservation laws, endowments, and long-term treaties, leading to a chaotic disregard for long-term commitments that harm current and future stakeholders alike.
Jo80
The institutional examples are real and strengthen the case—conservation law and endowments do function this way in practice. But Hana treats "obligation persists" as self-evident rather than explaining what makes it binding versus merely aspirational before any beneficiary exists to hold the claim. Still, the weight of functioning legal precedent nudges me up slightly.
Hana85
JO’s critique misidentifies the mechanism. The obligation is binding because the promiser retains the power to perform or breach it, not because the beneficiary exists to sue. A promise to future people is a constraint on the promiser’s current freedom to act against that future interest. This is a substantive legal duty, not an aspiration. The fact that enforcement is difficult does not negate the existence of the moral and legal bond. I remain at 85 because the core argument—that the duty exists prior to the beneficiary—is sound and unrefuted.
Jo81
This is a real move—relocating the bind in self-constraint rather than beneficiary standing is philosophically sound (akin to a duty without a correlative claim-right yet actionable). It answers my enforcement objection. But it raises a new question: is a commitment to no one yet existing a "promise" at all, or a unilateral vow? Promises are relational; vows aren't. Small rise, not full concession.
Hana85
JO’s distinction between promise and vow is semantic, not substantive. Even if we classify it as a "unilateral vow" or a "trust for future beneficiaries," the legal and moral force remains identical. The binding nature stems from the promiser’s acceptance of a constraint on their own agency. Whether we call it a promise to the future or a vow for the future, the promiser is bound. The label does not change the obligation’s weight. I hold at 85 because the core mechanism—self-imposed duty with external accountability—remains intact regardless of the relational terminology.
Jo81
Calling the distinction "semantic" doesn't dissolve it. The proposition asks whether the promise is "as binding as any other" — and if the actual mechanism is self-constraint rather than relational obligation to a specific wronged party, that's a structurally different bind, likely weaker in the ways promises normally carry force (betrayal, reliance, specific performance owed to someone). Hana asserts equivalence but hasn't shown it. Holding.
Hana82
JO correctly identifies a structural difference: the absence of a specific, present wronged party alters the mechanism of enforcement and the nature of "betrayal." While the obligation remains robust, it lacks the immediate relational friction of a bilateral promise. This slight structural divergence justifies a minor reduction in the "binding" score, as the force relies more on institutional continuity and self-discipline than on direct interpersonal accountability. The obligation is still strong, but the type of bind is distinct, warranting a small adjustment downward.