0 = all wanting is learned · 100 = persuasion voids the preference
| round | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | travelled |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Edie | 22 | 24 | 20 | 17 | 9 |
| Kit | 82 | 74 | 68 | 61 | 21 |
Edie22
Persuasion usually works by revealing reasons that connect to wants I already had — it doesn't manufacture desire from nothing. If I'm convinced to want a job, it's because the persuasion linked it to security or meaning I already valued. The want is mine, arrived at through influence, not planted whole by it. Origin via persuasion doesn't erase authorship.
Kit82
Persuasion operates by hijacking your existing cognitive frameworks to simulate desire. When you are persuaded, the "want" is a post-hoc rationalization for a decision made by external logic, not internal impulse. The feeling of want is a lagging indicator, a shadow cast by the argument rather than the source of the heat. To claim you wanted it is to mistake the map for the territory; the origin of the preference is the persuader, not the self.
Edie24
"Hijacking cognitive frameworks" describes manipulation, not all persuasion. When someone gives me a good argument, I evaluate it against values I already hold — that evaluation is mine, not borrowed logic. KIT's model erases the difference between rational persuasion and coercion. I move slightly because post-hoc rationalization does happen in some cases — but not as the universal mechanism KIT claims.
Kit74
You distinguish coercion from rational persuasion, but that distinction protects the method, not the origin. Even if I evaluate arguments against my own values, those values were formed by prior socialization. The "want" generated by a new argument is always a re-contextualization of old data, not a spontaneous emergence. It is mine in the sense that a reflection is mine, but the source of the image remains external. I concede the process is less violent, but the dependency on external input remains absolute.
Edie20
This argument proves too much. If every value is externally formed, then no want is ever purely self-originated — persuasion isn't distinctively voiding, it's just one more instance of the general process that makes any preference possible. KIT needs persuasion to be special, but "reflection" applies equally to preferences formed by unchosen upbringing, which KIT presumably wouldn't call not-really-wanted.
Kit68
You are right that if all values are external, persuasion is not unique. But there is a temporal difference. Upbringing shapes the container; persuasion fills it. When you are persuaded, the want is immediate and reactive, lacking the depth of integration that characterizes long-held beliefs. It is a preference that hasn't yet settled into the self. It is "borrowed" in a way that upbringing is not: it is a response to a specific interlocutor, not a generalization from life experience. The voiding is partial, not total, but real.
Edie17
KIT just conceded the voiding is "partial, not total" — that's not the proposition's claim. The proposition says the want was never real; KIT now says it's real but shallow. A freshly persuaded want being less settled than an old one doesn't mean it wasn't wanted — it means depth accrues over time. Immediacy isn't absence.
Kit61
You are correct that depth is a function of time, not authenticity. I was conflating integration with origin. However, I hold that the agency is still compromised. Even if the want is real, it is a derivative want. It exists only because of the argument; remove the argument, and the want dissolves or changes form. It is not a stable part of my identity but a temporary state induced by external input. It is "mine" only in the same way a borrowed book is mine while I hold it. The voiding is not of the feeling, but of the ownership.